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SHORT SELLING 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
  Data on the cost of short selling stocks has been noticeable by its almost entire 
absence until recently, and the research implications of such ignorance for both 
developments  in  asset  pricing  theory  and  the  empirical  implementation  of 
investment  strategies  is  only  recently  coming  to  be  better  understood.    Finance 
theory makes very strong assumptions about the ability of arbitrageurs to borrow 
and sell short large amounts of stock at no cost, (see Fama (1965, 1970), Ross 
(1976)).    Yet  while  short  selling  is  central  to  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis and asset pricing theory, there has been relatively little 
discussion regarding the mechanics, costs, feasibility and extent of short sales, let 
alone  its  market  impact.    That  constraints  on  short  selling,  whether  formal  and 
legalistic, or informal and cultural, can lead to overpricing of securities is the single 
most important theme of the literature:  these securities may well have low future 
returns until the overpricing is fully corrected.  Further, while direct trading costs 
such as  bid-ask spreads and commission  are incurred  when  buying  or selling a 
position, short sale costs is a holding cost and hence related to the length of time a 
short position is maintained:  this may well be for several months or even years for 
certain strategies such as momentum or value versus growth, and hence they will 
be greater than direct transaction costs. 
 
  In  this  discussion  we  concentrate  on  short  sales  of  equities
1:    we  begin  with  a 
discussion  of  the  perceived  restrictions  on  short  selling,  together  with  the 
implications of these restrictions and the information content of changes in short 
interest.  We then turn to the mechanics of short selling, the key facts that have 
emerged  from  proprietary  data  in  recent  years,  and  the  extent  of  short  selling 
restrictions in a global context.  We then examine how data issues have influenced 
research  before  reviewing  the  empirical  evidence  on  short  interest  and  market 
returns behaviour, including the  link to  earnings’  announcements.   We conclude 
with a brief discussion of UK experience and how recent research such as Nagel 
                                            
1   Of course, there are other well established alternatives to betting on downward movements in stock 
prices, including options and single stock futures; while we do not pursue them here, we note that 
some international comparisons of short selling rules do include such derivatives in their coverage 
(see Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) for put option regulations).    
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(2006) and Ali-Trombley (2006) are opening up new ways to think about mispricing 
and associated investment strategies. 
 
2.  Background 
 
  There can be little doubt that the term ‘short sale’ would be considered by many to 
be the most offensive term in the linguistics of finance and financial markets, being 
met  with  opprobrium  by  certain  market  commentators,  regulators  and  politicians 
alike, usually as markets swing downwards after unsustainable excesses, whether it 
is 1987 or 2001, or even with the suggestions that certain informed agents may 
have short sold insurance and airline stocks prior to the 9/11 events in the US.  
Chancellor  (2001)  provides  an  interesting  account  of  such  events  since  1600, 
emphasising that similar  events  and reactions have  occurred throughout history, 
whether it was the East India Company in 1609, the Mississippi and South Sea 
bubbles  of  the  early  18th  century,  the  Great  Wall  Street  Crash  of  1929,  or  the 
events of 2001, short sellers have been blamed for driving prices down, regulators 
have imposed, or considered restrictions, on short selling, and where governments 
have acquiesced to this pressure, such rules have had little market impact.  Further, 
he suggests that there is little or no evidence of short sellers being instrumental in 
forcing prices lower in many of the occasions in which they have attracted blame 
(i.e. the Asian currency crisis of 1997). 
 
  Although textbook accounts of asset pricing rely on unlimited arbitrage (and hence 
short-selling), another school of thought sees definite limits to these processes (e.g. 
Schleifer,  (2000),  Savor  and  Gamba-Cavazos  (2005)).    At  its  simplest,  if  short 
selling is costly and hence constrained, the marginal investor will be an optimist 
when a divergence of opinion exists (Miller (1977), see also Jarrow (1981)).  The 
key recent contribution of D’Avolio (2002), Nagel (2006), Ali-Trombley (2006) and 
others is to calibrate and explain this cost of short selling in the real market context, 
often  in  a  relative  rather  than  absolute  metric,  and  apply  such  findings  to  re-
examine investment “anomalies” that  are  inconsistent  with  perfect arbitrage.   As 
they  show  very  clearly,  some  major  sources  of  predictable  returns  such  as 
momentum investing, and value versus growth, may appear unprofitable when real 
world  short  selling  costs  are  appropriately  calibrated  and  hence  this  helps  us  
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discriminate between  the mispricing and risk  explanations for these “anomalies”, 
(e.g. Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003)). 
 
  The growing popularity of hedge funds has led to more detailed analysis of the role 
of  short  selling  investment  strategies.    The  use  of  accounting  data,  technical 
analysis and tax strategies by market short sell professionals is described by Taulli 
(2003), while the benefits of adding a short selling fund to a portfolio of other hedge 
fund strategies in terms of risk-return improvements is explained in Jaeger (2003).  
Basically short selling as  a strategy  is  often the only  one  which has  a  negative 
correlation with both other strategies and wider market indices, including equities 
and bonds, and hence is important in determining the shape of the mean-variance 
efficient frontier. 
 
  In the UK for FTSE 100 companies the average percentage of firms’ shares on loan 
in  the  market  has  increased  from  3½%  in  late  2003  to  over  5%  by  late  2005 
(Makinson Cowell (2005)); for FTSE 250 companies the average has risen from 2% 
to 3% over the same period.  Detailed figures for the US (e.g. D’Avolio (2002), show 
similar average levels.  These low figures are taken by many analysts as evidence 
that restrictions must exist that thwart short sellers; since short selling is not done in 
a centralised market, finding shares can sometimes be difficult or impossible, and 
hence price may only partially equilibrate supply and demand.  We can identify two 
general types of restriction: 
 
(i)  Market structures are not set up to make short selling easy.  Less than half 
the world’s exchanges actually allow short-selling (Charoenrook and Daouk 
(2005); there are regulations and procedures administered by the SEC and 
Federal  Reserve,  stock  exchanges,  underwriters  and  brokerage  firms  that 
can  impede  the  mechanics  of  short  selling,  while  legal  and  institutional 
restrictions can seriously inhibit investors from selling short (see Savor and 
Gamboa-Cavazos (2005)).  The so-called “uptick rule” states that NYSE and 
AMEX  stocks  can  only  be  sold  short  at  a  price  above  the  immediately 
preceding reported price (the “plus-tick) or at the last sale price if it is higher 
than  the  last  reported  price  (“zero-plus”  tick).    NASDAQ  prohibits  its 
members from short selling stocks at or below the current bid price. 
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(ii)  Deliberate  action  by  firms’  management  or  advisers  can  be  used  to  hurt 
short-sellers, e.g. through subterfuge, private investigators, harassment via 
civil  suits,  false  accusations  or  appeals  to  regulators  to  intimidate  short 
sellers.  Technical actions such as stock splits or distributions can disrupt 
short  selling,  and  management  can  work  closely  with  shareholders  to 
withdraw shares from the stock lending market.  Using a sample of 266 US 
firms  from  1977  to  2002  which  had  threatened,  taken  action  against,  or 
accused short sellers of illegal activity or false statements, Lamont (2004) 
finds abnormal returns of around -2% per month in the following year, and 
returns continue negative for some years to follow, suggesting that short-sale 
constraints  can  allow  very  substantial  overpricing  which  will  take  some 
considerable time to correct.  The public policy aspects of these restrictions 
are discussed in Lamont (2003) 
 
There are two extreme views on whether a higher level of short interest conveys 
positive or negative information on a stock:  Diamond and Verrechia (1987) argue 
that high short interest conveys negative information, with the constraints on short 
selling  raising  costs  and  reducing  its  incidence  by  liquidity  traders;  hence  short 
selling is more likely to involve informed traders, and hence higher levels of short 
interest reflect (genuine) negative information.  On the other hand, what might be 
called the ‘Wall Street’ view, is that high short interest is a bullish signal since it 
represents a ‘latent demand’ for a stock, which will transform into actual purchases 
at some point to cover this short position.  A so-called third way would have short 
interest  as  being  essentially  neutral  for  a  stock:    Senchak  and  Starks  (1993) 
emphasise  how  short  selling  may  be  driven  by  hedging  strategies,  arbitrage 
transactions and tax related reasons.  Indeed Barron’s magazine of May 1st, 1995, 
cites a survey finding that 75% of short interest positions are either hedged or part 
of some other trading strategy (see also Brent et al (1990)).  This latter view would 
suggest that short interest levels cannot help us predict market price reactions, (see 
also Chen et al (2002)):  this empirical issue has been a prime focus of applied work 
in this area. 
 
  A number of general themes related to short selling have emerged of interest to 
policymakers and academics: 
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(i)  From the theoretical perspective, do short-sale constraints, including costly 
transactions, impede the speed of price adjustment to new information?  Can 
they  help  us  understand  market  “anomalies”  and  distinguish  between 
mispricing and sources of risk? (e.g. Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003)) 
 
(ii)  Do changes in the level of short interest  (i.e. lending)  for a  stock convey 
positive or negative information about that security? 
 
(iii)  From  a  regulator’s  point  of  view,  can  short  sale  restrictions  reduce  the 
severity  of  price  declines,  and  hence  market  stability?    Recent  studies 
reviewing global short sale practices have allowed insight into this question 
(Charoenrook and Daouk (2005)), Bris et al (2003)). 
 
 
3.  Short Selling: Institutional Structure 
 
Despite its importance in the theory of finance, many academic and professional 
finance practitioners have little precise knowledge of the nature and extent of short 
selling.  While this was perhaps largely due to the lack of publicly available data in 
this area, this is changing with research based on proprietary information providing 
new insights.  D’Avolio (2002) is such a paper, utilising 18 months of daily loan 
positions and transaction information for every US equity security on the books of 
one of the largest (but unnamed) security lenders in the world.  Ali and Trombley 
(2006)  describe  the  short  selling  process  and  some  of  D’Avolio’s  (2002)  key 
statistics; at the risk of repetition we explain the process in a little more detail as it is 
generally not well understood. 
 
To short sell a share in company XYZ the seller, Agent A, must find an existing 
owner of XYZ shares, Agent B, who is both able and willing to lend the shares.  
Having  negotiated  the  loan  of  the  shares,  ‘A’  may  then  short  sell  the  borrowed 
share to any willing purchaser, ‘C’. 
 
The  short  seller  (or  borrower  of  the  share)  ‘A’  must  deposit  collateral  with  the 
lender, ‘B’ equal, to 102% of the market value, marked to market daily:  according to 
industry  sources,  a  tiny  proportion,  around  2%,  is  collateralised  with  Treasury  
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securities,  and  the  rest  as  cash.    If  the  lender  is  a  US  broker-dealer  then  an 
additional 50% margin is required, though this is not the case for trades between 
broker dealers.  In the UK and Europe transactions collateralised with cash are less 
common  but  they  are  increasing:    collateral  may  include  both  government, 
corporate, and convertible bonds, as well as equities, and is typically 105% of the 
value of the lent securities (Makinson Cowell, 2005). 
 
So how does ‘B’ get rewarded for lending the stock?  Clearly ‘B’ has use of the cash 
collateral for as long as the stock is lent to ‘A’; so, the fee ‘A’ pays ‘B’ is actually a 
reverse cashflow (usually!), ‘B’ paying ‘A’ a rebate for use of the cash collateral; this 
rebate rate is analogous to ‘repo’ rate for bond lending, and comprises the market 
rate for cash funds less the stock loan fee (which in extreme cases, as we shall see, 
can be negative).  Hence if the cash rate is 4% and the stock loan fee is 1.5%, then 
the rebate from B to A would be 2.5% (4%-1.5%).  If A and B agree to a rebate of -
35%, then A in effect pays B 39%, i.e. 35% plus 4% foregone interest.  Note that 
interest is calculated each business day and settled monthly. 
 
  One  important  piece  of  terminology  in  the  literature  distinguishes  special  stocks 
from general collateral (or GC):  the former refer to stocks with high fees (i.e. low 
rebates) and the latter to those with the basic fee of around 15 basis points in the 
US.  This came about from another view of the whole process:  if we view it as A 
lending B cash with B offering stock as collateral; if B can replace the collateral with 
any stock then it is called general collateral, wherein if a specific stock is involved A 
will hold special collateral, and will charge a lower rate for the cash or Treasury 
securities on loan at B.  ‘A’ has to replicate and pay any dividends/distributions on 
the  borrowed  stock,  while  B  no  longer  has  shareholder  rights,  such  as  voting.  
Lenders rarely recall shares simply to exercise voting rights:  there is a consensus, 
certainly in the UK, that securities “should not be borrowed solely for the purpose of 
exercising the voting rights” (Securities Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance, 
Bank of England Securities Lending and Repo Committee, December, 2004).  At 
the AGM of British Land in 2002 an activist investment fund, Laxey Partners, tabled 
a motion to unseat the chairman and voted their 9% holding, of which 8% had been 
borrowed  for  the  purpose  of  voting  (Makinson  Cowell  (2005)).    Disclosure  and 
ownership of such holdings is under review by the Takeover Panel in the UK as of 
mid-2005.  
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A  key  feature  of  this  stock  lending  procedure  is  that  most  lenders,  especially 
institutions, maintain the right to recall the loan at any time, and this may be driven 
by legal or tax requirements:  in the US for pension funds this is an explicit ERISA 
requirement, while for mutual funds it is required under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940.  Similarly the IRS requires the recall rule for manufactured dividend 
payments to stay as non-taxable income for certain exempt funds, and for the loan 
not to be treated as a sale.  Hence the loans are effectively rolled over each night 
until the shares are returned voluntarily or recalled, at which point the borrower ‘A’ 
has 3 days to return the share, borrow from another investor, or cover the short sale 
by buying the share; if after 5 days the shares are not returned to B, the latter has a 
legal right to use the collateral to buy in the borrowed share on the open market. 
 
Who  provides  the  shares  for  short  selling?    The  actual  transaction  is  usually 
effected by large custody banks (e.g. State Street) on behalf of institutional owners, 
such as pension funds, mutual funds and endowments, with, unsurprisingly, passive 
indexers the most actively involved in their custodian’s lending since their need for 
specific  stocks  at  any  moment  in  time  will  be  much  less  than  that  of  an  active 
manager.  The natural advantage of custodians as intermediaries here is that they 
can  replace  recalled  loans  from  a  client  by  shares  held  on  behalf  of  other 
customers, offering a big reduction in disruption and search costs for borrowers.  
Broker-dealers can also lend from their own market makers and trading desks, or 
their own institutional customer accounts.  Custody banks are the largest and most 
reliable source of stock for lending. 
 
  Who actually gets involved in borrowing the stock?  Clearly market makers will have 
inventory management requirements, while derivatives traders will need to sell short 
to hedge positions:  hedge fund ‘long-short’ strategies have an obvious need, as do 
merger and convertible arbitrage strategies. 
 
In the US most stocks can be borrowed.  D’Avolio (2002) offers detailed descriptive 
statistics for the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) universe from his 
proprietary database for the period April 2000, through September 2001:  at most 
16% of the 8000 or so stocks on CRSP cannot be shorted, and these account for 
under  1% of the total market capitalisation; over half of these  are under $5 per  
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share; and around 10% of the stocks are never shorted.  The cost of shorting is for 
the institution’s value-weighted lending portfolio, 25 basis points per annum, and 
only 7% by value is actually borrowed; over 90% of the stocks lent out cost less 
than 1% p.a. to borrow, and these so-called ‘general collateral’ stocks have a value-
weighted  mean  fee  of  17  basis  points;  the  remaining  9%  of  loaned  stocks  are 
‘specials’, having fees above 1% and a mean fee of 4.3% p.a., with less than 1% of 
stocks  becoming  ‘extremely  special’,  with  negative  rebate  fees,  i.e.  loan  fees  in 
excess of the risk-free rate.  Celebrated cases of the latter include GM at 63% and 
Unilever N.V. at 46% (see Table 4, p.287, D’Avolio (2002)).   
 
In the UK the average (from proprietary data) is considered to be around 14 bp p.a., 
but is somewhat higher in other European markets at around 40 bp p.a. (Makinson 
Cowell (2005)).  Fees can go as low as 5 bp for large FTSE 100 stocks, or up to 
400 bp (and beyond) for smallcap stocks. 
 
Perhaps unsurprising given the sophistication of the intermediation process is that 
recall is extremely rare, with only 2% of the stocks on loan being recalled in any 
month in the US, though having been recalled the mean time before the short can 
be re-established with the lender is 23 trading days.  Forced covering of recalled 
shorts tends to occur when trading volume is at least the daily average.  Since the 
largest suppliers of stock for lending are the large institutions, and these tend to 
have a higher proportion of large cap, liquid stocks, then passive index funds have 
a disproportionate presence in the loan market, and constituents of indices such as 
the S&P 500 are provided in excess supply, and hence are nearly always ‘cheap’ to 
borrow,  i.e.  are  ‘general  collateral’.    Finally,  what  makes  a  stock  ‘special’  (i.e. 
expensive to borrow)?  D’Avolio (2002) provides an empirical analysis suggesting 
an inverse relation with market cap and institutional ownership (‘supply’), and a role 
for heterogeneity of investor opinion, ‘demand’ (e.g. disparate analysts’ forecasts, 
high turnover) (see also Nagel (2006), Chen et al (2002)).  This approach is used 
and extended by Ali and Trombley (2006) to calibrate the relative expense of short 
selling a stock. 
 
4.  Short Selling:  Data Issues and Research Implications 
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  However interesting the theoretical and practical issues alluded to earlier, without 
high quality data there is little opportunity for the financial economist to shed much 
light on an area.  The literature on short selling has exploded over the last few years 
precisely  because  new  data  is  finally  becoming  available,  albeit  in  a  selective, 
proprietary fashion.   Whereas CRSP and  NASDAQ have  offered high frequency 
data over various time periods for stock prices and related characteristics, short 
interest data has only been available at monthly intervals, inhibiting event studies 
and similar methods.  Further, the cost of short selling has been almost entirely 
unavailable until proprietary data has been obtained for studies such as D’Avolio 
(2002)  and  Cohen  et  al  (2005).    More  recently  (2005,  Q1)  NASDAQ  has  made 
available intraday data.  Only Australia has had a substantial run of real time data 
identifying  short  sales  (Aitken  et  al  (1998)),  and  hence  such  a  study  is  unique 
whereas in other markets there is an exhaustive array of such research (e.g. LIFFE 
derivatives’ markets, see Buckle, et al (1998a)). 
 
  The  absence  of short sales costs has also proved a thorny issue, since trading 
strategies/market  anomalies  based  on  arbitrage  portfolios  can  be  completely 
misleading, (Ali-Trombley (2006), Nagel (2006)).  One exception is the data used by 
Jones and Lamont (2002) for 90 actively traded stocks per month for the period 
1926-1933 (at which point the data was discontinued); these stocks appeared in a 
centralised  stock  loan  market  on  the  floor  of  the  NYSE,  hence  indicating  high 
shorting demand.  Indeed, some had short selling costs of over 50% per annum:  
stocks with high costs were associated with low subsequent returns, around 12-
24% lower than similar stocks over the following year, again suggesting they were 
overpriced.    This  return  predictability  suggests  that  short  selling  costs  keep 
arbitrageurs from forcing down the prices of overvalued stocks, consistent with the 
‘overpricing’ hypothesis. 
 
  That D’Avolio (2002) is able to offer direct insights into the short selling costs of a 
large number of CRSP stocks facilitates the Ali-Trombley (2006) methodology of 
identifying the factors which make certain stocks expensive to short sell and they 
use this information in the context of momentum portfolio strategies to see if such 
predictable returns are actually profitable.  Clearly, empirical studies which involve 
arbitrage  strategies  should  really  contain  appropriate  transaction  costs,  including 
potentially  substantial  short  selling  costs,  before  we  can  feel  confident  on  the  
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efficacy of any strategy:  this has been neglected to date in the literature but surely 
should  become  integrated  into  mainstream  anomaly  studies  when  such  data 
becomes  available.    Indeed,  the  creation  of  a  reliable  database  to  complement 
D’Avolio (2002) on the costs of short selling, both across stocks and over time, 
would seem to be a priority for progress in scientific studies of arbitrage strategies.  
Cohen et al (2005) go an important stage further in the analysis with proprietary 
panel data for 4 years on both quantity and cost of short sales, and hence claim to 
identify separately supply and demand shifts.  In other words, a low level of short 
interest may not indicate low short sale demand but limited supply.  They find that it 
is  not  so  much  high  loan  fees  or  high  quantities  of  short  interest  that  convey 
information, but rather shifts in demand for short selling that dominate reductions in 
supply.  Even in a highly sophisticated capital market such as the UK stock market 
there was much debate prior to average stock lending data being made available 
monthly on CREST in September 2003 (see Section 8 below). 
 
  Hence,  research  on  short-selling  has  suffered  from  a  dearth  of  high  frequency, 
appropriate quantity data, the well nigh impossibility of separating quantity data into 
that associated with hedging and arbitrage from that involving pure bets on price 
falls, and the almost complete absence of information on the costs of short selling.  
Hence  attempts  to  identify  demand  and  supply  influences  must  necessarily  be 
incomplete.  However, the collation of  proprietary  data on loan fees by D’Avolio 
(2002)  in  particular  gave  new  insights  into  the  cost  of  short  selling  which  were 
previously not available.  It also allowed calibration of economic influences on these 
costs,  which  Ali  and  Trombley  (2006)  then  extend  backwards  to  1984  from  the 
D’Avolio  (2002)  period  of  2000-2001,  giving  themselves  a  longer  data  period  to 
examine strategies such as momentum investing.  Nagel (2006) investigates the 
low book-to-market overpricing with references to institutional ownership of shares 
as a proxy for the lack of short selling supply, though clearly the multi-factor criteria 
of Ali and Trombley (2006), if robust with respect to individual control variables as 
well as a summary statistic in the form of an econometric model, should be superior 
and  lends  itself  to  use  in  similar  contexts,  where  such  anomalies/investment 
strategies are well documented.  Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) also investigate 
the book-to-market effect and use institutional ownership as a proxy for short-selling 
costs, though they also include idiosyncratic stock volatility to capture arbitrage risk  
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and  the  number  of  analysts  following  a  stock  as  a  measure  of  investor 
sophistication. 
 
D’Avolio himself (p.274, 2002) acknowledges that the loan fees on his sample do 
not seem high enough to explain return anomalies or short selling reluctance; after 
all only around 2-3% of US market capitalisation is short sold at any time.  Rather, 
they are useful in helping understand the limits to arbitrage, and help justify the Ali 
and Trombley (2006) method of using proxies for loan fees based on observable 
stock characteristics that capture loan demand by short sellers and available supply 
combined as one measure reflecting the probability that the loan fee is high.  The 
five  factors  identified,  including  firm  size  and  cash  flow,  can  be  the  basis  for 
separate  in  depth  analysis  in  parallel  fashion.    The  fact  that  they  omit  some  of 
D’Avolio’s (2002) unimportant variables is less significant than the assumption that 
the calibration is robust over an 18-year period.  After all, this is an empirical area 
with a dearth of relevant data and hence it is impossible to conclusively believe in 
the results.  However, given that the momentum returns are found to be robust with 
respect to  both the components of, and aggregate measure of the key variable, 
short  sale  constraints,  then  we  should  have  some  confidence  in  the  findings.  
Nevertheless,  since  D’Avolio’s  (2002)  loan  fee  data  is  only  for  institutional 
transactions, and over a limited time-period, complete comfort in loan fee costs is 
not possible. 
 
5.  Short Selling Restrictions around the World 
 
There  have  recently  been  two  studies  seeking  to  document  the  extent  of  short-
selling  restrictions  throughout  the  world.    Bris  et  al  (2003)  examine  47  equity 
markets  for  the  period  1990-2001,  quizzing  regulators,  investment  banks  and 
institutional investors on the legality and practice of short-selling, in particular the 
tax effects of short positions, settlement cycles, and the registration requirements of 
short-selling.    Charoenrouk  and  Daouk  (2005)  look  at  the  history  of  both  short-
selling and put option trading regulations and practices for 111 countries based on a 
questionnaire for regulators covering the legality and feasibility of short-selling, and 
whether put options are available for trading.  Since Charoenrouk and Daouk (2005) 
focus on market wide index returns, their data period extends from 1969 through 
2002.  
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Beginning  from  Diamond  and  Verrechia’s  (1987)  insight  that  short-selling 
constraints  impede  the  market’s  ability  to  rapidly  impound  value  relevant 
information, both studies exploit the cross-section/time-series nature of their data to 
address a variety of important policy issues.  Bris et al (2003) suggest that markets 
where short-selling is both legal and practised, show more efficient price discovery, 
manifesting itself in reduced synchronicity in individual stock returns:  more efficient 
markets  have  more  idiosyncratic  risk,  and  the  ratio  of  firm  specific  to  market 
information is higher, as agents can act quickly and inexpensively. Using a market 
efficiency  measure  developed  by  Morck  et  al  (2000),  they  find  a  negative 
association  between  short-sales  restrictions  and  the  diffusion  of  value  relevant 
information  into  prices.    Their  second  line  of  enquiry  involves  the  conjecture  by 
regulators that short-selling restrictions can reduce the relative severity of market 
panics, and this can be tested via examining the skewness of stocks and market 
indices.  There is weak evidence that for individual securities at least, restrictions 
are associated with less negative skewness, and indeed a lower probability of an 
extreme negative value.  However, this does not carry over to the aggregate market 
level, where the presence of restrictions does not seem to prevent market crashes.  
An alternative approach is to look at the case where restrictions were lifted during 
the sample period:  here idiosyncratic risk rose on average by 27%, emphasising 
the  link  between  restrictions  and  individual  stock  behaviour,  Charoenrouk  and 
Daouk (2005) also find no evidence that short-sale restrictions affect the level of 
skewness of aggregate market returns, or indeed the probability of a market crash 
occurring,  though  the  volatility  of  stock  returns  is  lower  and  liquidity  is  higher.  
These findings arise from a panel study where the dependent variable is skewness 
or  volatility,  or  a  proxy  for  market  crashes  or  liquidity,  while  a  binary  variable 
reflecting the country’s ability to take short positions appears on the right-hand side, 
along with various control variables. 
 
6.  Short Selling and Stock Returns 
 
A key question for analysts and policymakers is whether short selling actually leads 
to predictable changes in stock prices.  As we saw earlier, one school of thought 
associated with practitioners is that a build-up of short interest may lead to a rise in 
stock prices as it represents ‘latent demand’ for the stock which at some point will  
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have to be covered.  A major problem with establishing a link between short interest 
and returns is that the former data has only been available in the US as a monthly 
snapshot  and  hence  high  frequency  studies  which  can  remove  contaminating 
events have been difficult. 
 
It is no surprise, then, that early research proved far from conclusive, with no clear, 
unambiguous indication of the relation between short selling and subsequent stock 
prices:  for example, see Seneca (1967), Major (1968), Smith (1968); McDonald 
and Baron (1973), using a random sample of 100 NYSE stocks for the five years up 
to 1966 found a direct relation between short interest and risk (i.e. beta), with, on 
average, a negative return accruing to short-sellers.  Figlewski and Webb (1993) 
also find no strong relation between short interest and abnormal returns, whereas 
Senchak  and  Starks  (1993)  find  that  stocks  with  unexpected  increases  in  short 
interest generate statistically significant but small, negative abnormal returns for a 
short period around the announcement data. 
 
More recently Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) examined the relation for the NYSE, 
Amex,  and  NASDAQ  aggregate  markets,  and  also  for  a  random  sample  of  100 
companies  for  the  period  1986-91,  the  starting  date  being  that  at  which  short-
interest data for NASDAQ first became available.  Based upon simple regression of 
returns on changes in short interest, together with control variables such as size 
and market return, the results ‘provide strong refutation of the popular notion that 
short sellers earn abnormal profits at the expense of less informed investors’ (p.20).  
If  anything,  the  finding  of  a  positive  relation  between  short-selling  and  returns 
(adjusted  both  for  risk  and  market  movements)  for  companies  suggests  that  on 
average short sellers are actually selling as stock prices rise and reducing short 
positions  as  they  fall,  in  other  words  acting  as  a  moderating,  contrarian,  force.  
Overall, they find that a high level of short interest is not necessarily a bullish or a 
bearish  indicator  for  stock  prices,  and  also  that  short-sellers  on  average  do  not 
possess superior investment timing skills.  Rather, they seem to act as stabilising 
liquidity providers. 
 
A much improved data offering is provided by the Australian Stock Exchange, ASX, 
which  gathers  trade  data,  including  short  sales  information,  and  sells  it  on  to 
brokers  and  institutions  online  in  real  time;  hence  short  selling  related  activity  
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becomes transparent very soon after the time of trade execution.  Such intraday 
data lends itself to a high frequency event study, unlike the monthly discrete US 
data.  Using data on all orders placed, as well as trades executed on the electronic 
trading  system of ASX, from 1994-1996 inclusive, Aitken et al (1998) offers a rich 
descriptive insight into short selling behaviour, and finds an average -0.20% fall in 
stock value within 15 minutes or 20 trades (see Buckle et al (1998b) for evidence of 
more rapid adjustment within other markets), offering some evidence in support of 
the  Diamond-Verrechia (1987)  hypothesis that  short  trades are  more informative 
than sell trades due to restrictions on short selling. 
 
Further analysis of US data still had to make do with short interest information at 
monthly intervals, so the focus turned to more extensive coverage of stocks and to 
subsets with particular features of interest, such as intensive short selling.  Desai et 
al (2000) examined all NASDAQ listed stocks with any short interest for the period 
1988-1994, taking the view that since listing requirements are easier on NASDAQ 
than NYSE, then informational asymmetry is likely to be greater and hence short 
interest may well be more informative for NASDAQ stocks.  Indeed, they find that 
‘high’ short interest stocks (i.e. those with over 2½% of shares  outstanding sold 
short), have significantly negative abnormal returns -0.76% per month, falling to -
1.13% per month for those with short interest over 10%, and in contrast to Aitken et 
al (1998), such information is gradually absorbed into prices.  This suggests strong 
support for the ‘academic’ view that short interest is a bearish signal for a stock 
(Diamond-Verrechia (1987)), and indeed the strength of the signal rises both with 
the level of short interest and the length of time it is heavily shorted.  An interesting 
adjunct finding is that high short interest is associated with a high rate of delisting 
and/or liquidation; indeed nearly 13% of firms with a short interest of over 2.5% of 
shares outstanding are so affected within 36 months. 
 
Lamont and Stein (2003) examine aggregate short interest for both the NYSE and 
NASDAQ and find that it varies counter cyclically, and that the ratio of put-to-call 
option  volumes  displays  a  similar  pattern.    Whereas  in  cross-section  data  it  is 
generally considered that the most ‘overvalued’ stocks attract the most short selling 
demand (see Dechow et al (2001), over time total short interest in NASDAQ   
stocks during the recent dot-com bubble actually decline as the index approaches 
its  peak;  this  is  consistent  with  Schleifer  and  Vishny  (1997)  who  argue  that  the  
 
16 
open-ended nature of most professional arbitrage firms makes it difficult for these 
firms to resist aggregate mispricings.  This also suggests that short-selling does not 
act as a stabilising force for overall stock market movements. 
 
  The need for improved data for US markets to give a more robust understanding of 
the nature and implications of short selling is met to some degree by the study of 
Diether et al (2005).  They use newly SEC-mandated tick-by-tick NASDAQ data for 
Q1, 2005, to look at the link between short-selling activity and future returns.  The 
data allows identification of trade size and the separation of short sales by investors 
who are subject to rules from market makers who are exempt.  A major finding from 
this new data is that short sales represent on average around 25% of NASDAQ 
reported  shares  volume,  whereas  monthly  short  interest  data  reveals  a  short 
interest of only 3.3%, suggesting for the first time that a high fraction of short sales 
in daily volume involves intraday or at least short-term trading strategies, and that 
the  monthly  ‘snapshot’  may  well  represent  window  dressing.    Of  this  25%,  two-
thirds is short-sales by traders subjects to short-sale rules.  The other key finding is 
that short-sellers are, on average, contrarian, selling short after positive returns, a 
result similar to Woolridge and Dickinson (1994).  Higher short sales predict future 
negative returns, in some cases up to 5 days ahead, but a trading strategy based 
on daily short selling incurs costs large enough to remove any profits.  It is basically 
small trades that have predictive power.  However, Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos 
(2005) find that short sellers cover their positions after suffering losses and increase 
them after gains. 
 
7.  Short Selling and Earnings’ Announcements 
 
  Do  short  sellers  pay  particular  attention  to  the  quality  of  earnings  and  the 
announcement of earnings?  Are they able to exploit earnings’ based anomalies?  
The  literature  suggests  that  short  sellers  both  anticipate  earnings  surprises  and 
trade after earnings’ announcements.  Cao and Kolasinski (2005) examine whether 
short  sellers  exploit  two  well  documented  anomalies,  namely  post-earnings 
announcement drift and the accrual anomaly; in particular, is the intensity of short-
selling related to the  severity  of the market under/overreactions to  earnings and 
accruals?    Indeed,  short  sellers  attempt  to  exploit  both  anomalies,  though 
surprisingly  perhaps,  there  is  no  evidence  that  prices  converge  more  quickly  to  
 
17 
fundamental  levels  in  the  presence  of  short  selling.    Using  (monthly)  data  from 
NASDAQ for the  period  1995-2003,  and looking  at short interest for the newest 
month-long  period  that  begins  after  the  earnings  announcement,  the  study 
examines returns for 182 days after an earnings’ announcement/surprise, it finds 
that short sellers can earn high returns by short selling stocks that have negative 
earnings’ shocks and high income increasing accruals (the latter being in contrast to 
Richardson (2003), who looks at accruals in isolation).  In contrast Cristophe et al 
(2004) look at short sales in the 5 days before earnings announcement for a sample 
of over 900 NASDAQ firms; they find a significant negative relationship between 
unusual short selling activity before the announcement and the subsequent post-
announcement change in stock pricing, suggesting that a significant proportion of 
short  sellers  are  informed  traders.    Further  analysis  suggests  that  while  the 
transactions are in part influenced by the fundamental characteristics of firms, the 
selling  is  more  likely  to  be  related  to  information  specific  to  the  forthcoming 
announcement.  Clearly, making short selling information more quickly and readily 
available could improve market efficiency in this context. 
 
8.  UK Experience:  Stock Lending, Dividend Arbitrage and Crest 
 
  As  we  noted  earlier,  data  limitations  in  the  US  and  elsewhere  have  hindered 
empirical  analysis  of  short-selling,  though  this  is  being  gradually  reversed.    In 
September  2003, Crest, the UK’s stock clearing house began to make available 
data  on  what  has  been  described  even  by  practitioners  as  ‘a  little  known  and 
opaque area of the UK stock market’ (see Chambers (2004)), namely stock lending.  
Crest  offers  monthly  average  stock  lending  positions  for  FTSE  350  companies 
(together with some large Irish companies) on its website, www.crestco.co.uk and, 
more frequently, with a one-week delay, by subscription.  However, we should note 
that not all shares of a stock will be ‘in Crest’, since this refers to electronic, non-
certified holdings of shares.  Yet preliminary analysis by Chambers (2004) for FTSE 
350 companies finds  a close  correlation  between shares in issue and shares in 
Crest, and also between the percentage of shares on loan and the proportion held 
inside and outside of Crest:  hence the proportion of stock lending on a particular 
stock is generally independent of how it is held, and thus Crest data should give a 
good indication of the extent of stock lending, both by stock and over time.  Table 1 
below shows the equally weighted average of the stock on loan within the CREST  
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system  to  be  between  3%  and  4½%  since  the  inception  in  September  2003.  
However, for individual stocks this can rise to over 40% at various times.  Figure 1 
shows a simple plot of the stock loan percentage for 3 large UK firms:  EGG did not 
pay  a  dividend  over  this  period  but  still  had  levels  above  10%  at  times,  British 
Aerospace  had  a  clear  peak  at  25%  or  more,  possibly  associated  with  cash 
dividend  arbitrage  (see  Makinson  Cowell  (2005)),  while  Prudential  had  notable 
spikes but at a lower level of around 5% which may reflect scrip dividend arbitrage 
(again see Makinson Cowell (2005)):  daily data for the latter would have revealed 
much greater percentage spikes.   
 
Of  course,  not  all  borrowed  stock  is  for  short  selling:    for  example,  ‘fails 
management’  required  stock  lending  if  a  clearing  transaction  fails,  say  due  to  a 
computer  failure,  and  it  takes  place  simply  for  technical  purposes  rather  than  a 
portfolio trade:  hence it is essentially market neutral.  Dividend arbitrage is another 
reason to borrow stocks common to the UK.  This may refer to cash dividends, 
whereby the differential tax rules faced by different investors may be exploited:  the 
Makinson  Cowell  (2005)  review  points  to  French  tax  rules  providing  French 
investors with a 10% tax credit on dividend income which is not available to UK 
investors.  An institution, often a French bank, agrees to borrow UK equities ahead 
of the dividend record data in order to receive the dividend payment.  Clearly this 
borrower can derive a greater net dividend return from the stock than the lender, 
and hence can compensate the lender and still profit.  Such stock lending activity 
can  be very  significant, raising to  above  10% of stock in Crest around  dividend 
dates for FTSE 100 companies, compared to a year round average of 5% or less.  
A related source of borrowing stocks is scrip dividend arbitrage, whereby an issuer 
offers shareholders the choice of receiving a cash dividend or a scrip dividend at a 
discount to market price, but certain funds, such as index traders, cannot take the 
scrip alternative  as  their holdings  would  become larger than  allowed  under their 
portfolio guidelines.  In this case, stock can be lent out with the borrower choosing 
the script alternative and selling in the market and using the proceeds to pay the 
lender the cash dividend, with the borrower making a profit equal to the difference 
between  the  market  value  of  the  shares  and  the  cash  dividend,  less  the  stock 
lending  fee.    The  lending  period  for  this  activity  is  much  shorter  than  for  cash 
dividend arbitrage and the percentage of Crest stocks lent out can jump above 20% 
from an average of 2% in certain instances.  
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9.  Concluding Comments 
 
If overpricing of costly-to-short sell, low book-to-market stocks generates a big part 
of the book-to-market effect (Nagel (2006)), Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003)), and 
similar conclusions apply to the overpriced losers in Ali and Trombley (2006), then a 
new  insight  is  emerging  that  puts  short  sales  constraints  at  the  centre  of  our 
understanding  of  certain  investment  strategies/market  anomalies  which  rely  on 
some categories of stocks becoming overpriced.  Nagel (2006) sees much of the 
value premium arising from market segments where its existence appears to be 
most consistently explained by mispricing and short sale constraints, rather than by 
covariance  with  some  underlying  risk  factor.    Hence  just  as  book-to-market  has 
entered  textbook  asset  pricing  as  part  of  a  ‘three-factor’  model,  so  short  selling 
constraints appear to challenge this approach with an alternative interpretation:  if 
arbitrage costs exceed arbitrage benefits than  systematic mispricing  may  persist 
(Schleifer and Vishny (1997)).  Similarly, momentum, while not given quite the same 
exposure  as  a  factor  as  ‘value’,  may  also  be  considered  to  be  at  least  partly 
explicable by short sales constraints.  Ali and Trombley (2006) do much more than 
construct ‘a reliable index of short sales constraints using easily observable stock 
characteristics’; their results suggest that other predictable return regularities should 
be  investigated  to  assess  the  importance  of  short  sales  constraints  in  these 
processes.  Ofek et al (2002) establish the importance of such costs for options 
strategies. 
 
Most  investors  never  short  sell,  yet  for  most  large  capitalisation  stocks  it  is  not 
difficult to short sell; we still do  not know why so little short selling takes place.  
Constraints which are difficult to calibrate, such as information shortfall, cultural, risk 
perceptions,  and  institutional  behaviour  may  be  behind  this.    Yet  the  more 
persuasive  evidence  presented  here  suggests  that  short  sales  are  a  stabilising 
(contrarian) force and their introduction into a wide variety of countries has not been 
associated  with  an  increased  likelihood  of  a  financial  crash.    However,  more 
conclusive analysis of  the role  of short sales on investment  regularities requires 
data on both the quantity and price of short selling at a higher frequency than is 
currently available. 
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Summary Statistics for the Average Monthly Stock on Loan in the CREST 
System Sep 2003 – Nov 2005 
 
Month  Average Stock on 
Loan per 
Company (%) 
Maximum Stock 
on Loan for 
Individual 
Company (%) 
Minimum Stock 
on Loan for 
Individual Share 
(%) 
Sep-03  3.09  38.66  0.00 
Oct-03  3.22  42.01  0.20 
Nov-03  3.16  43.52  0.11 
Dec-03  3.09  45.09  0.19 
Jan-04  2.99  43.39  0.11 
Feb-04  3.15  39.85  0.11 
Mar-04  3.44  44.58  0.15 
Apr-04  3.47  41.01  0.09 
May-04  3.69  42.90  0.16 
Jun-04  3.72  42.80  0.00 
Jul-04  3.98  42.22  0.00 
Aug-04  4.24  43.08  0.00 
Sep-04  4.29  44.87  0.16 
Oct-04  4.14  25.84  0.13 
Nov-04  4.05  29.97  0.14 
Dec-04  3.66  27.55  0.12 
Jan-05  3.35  23.85  0.19 
Feb-05  3.55  25.81  0.11 
Mar-05  3.88  23.00  0.04 
Apr-05  4.20  25.85  0.05 
May-05  4.16  26.13  0.02 
Jun-05  4.02  28.55  0.15 
Jul-05  4.06  21.79  0.02 
Aug-05  4.09  24.49  0.27 
Sep-05  4.15  24.02  0.14  
 
27 
27 
Oct-05  4.29  23.75  0.13 
Nov-05  4.50  29.38  0.12 
 